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A recent analysis of the state of negotiation research
through 1982 (Kochan and erma, 1983) presented the following
rather pessimistic assessment:
... the rejection of the "management principles" approach to
organization theory (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March,
1963). along with the social turmoil of the 1960's, helped
organizational theorists to begin to bring conflict out of
the closet and to recognize that conflict may not only be a
naturally occurring organizational phenomenon but that it
would have positive as well as negative consequences for
different organzational actors (Coser, 1956; Pondy, 1967).
Little progress was made in going beyond this elementary
point.. .sttdying organizational systems, and the di scussion
of conflict, power- and negotiations,, is :insightful and
r-efreshing, but all of these wor::s still focus on the level
of paradi gm development and articulation. None of them take
us far enough down the onceptual ladder to suggest
strategies for organizational design and principles for
guiding organizational activities that can be used by
individuals interested in i nfl uenc:ing or changing
organizations or the behavior of individuals within them... In
short, -useful theories of negotiation within and between
(among) organizations have yet to be developed...
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This statement articulated both the importance of the topic of
negotiations in organizations (a central premise of this volume),
and its limited state of development three years ago.
In the three years since Kochan and Verma's paper, research
and teaching on the topic of negotiation in organizations has
e.xpanded considerably. Evidence of this increased interest
includes the creation of elective courses on negotiation at a
large number of management schools, a significant increase in the
frequency of dispute-related publications in organizational
behavior journals, the commonality of symposia and conferences on
negotiation related topics, and attention of the management
community to the importance of negotiation in their- professional
lives (Lewicki and Eazerman, 1984). Thus, the state of
negotiation research today is very different from the state nf
research three years ago. Our current ass.essment will suggest
that in some domains of negotiation research, basic intellectual
aruiments and propositions are now being ri..gorously tested within
organizational settings and translated into prescriptive writings
designed to improve the practice of organi zatt ional negotiations.
I-n other area.s of negotiat. on researc:h, however , the field has
exerted little movement during the preceding period.
In this paper we will take sto: of the cu!..rrent state of
theory and research on negotiations in organizations by brieFly
reviewing several different intell.ectual tracks. The four tracks
or intellectual traditions we draw on closely reflect the
material cover-ed in this vol.ume and its predecessor (Bazerman and
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Lewicki 1983), as well as some issues that we believe are
relevant to negotiation research in organizations, but have not
received much attention. We do not seekl to provide a general
review of literature. Nor do we assert that all of the arguments
advanced here are well-documented empirical findings. Rather we
attempt to comment on the state of major domains of research
which we see as being central to the study of negotiations in
organizations, and to thereby stimulate further inquiry. The
four domains examined in this paper include: (1) behavioral and
analytic models of the negotiation process; (2) third party
intervention; (.3 coalitions; and (4) macro economic and/or
political models of conflict and :its resolution. First, however,
we will note the developments in the broader environment which
are stimulating the rising interest in thrse subjects.
Envi ronmental Influences on Resear,-h Development
Some argue that academia stays ahead of changes in the
environment. Others argue that academia learns from and responds
to the environment.. While we certainly hope that negotiation
researchers will influence managerial behavior, ample evidence
ex ists that environmental changes preceded the recent increase in
research outputs that we hve witnessed in the field of
negotiation. In this section, we outline mu.ltiple factors which
we believe have affected the recent surge in the popularity of
negotiation related materials. We will use this analysis of
environmental changes as we discuss the four substantive areas.
.. ,._
First, the accelerating technological and societal changes of
the 1960's and 1970's led organizational theorists to identify
muLltiple forms of organizational design for horizontal
communication (task forces, product teams in a functional
hierarchy, matrix organizations, etc.) (Galbraith, 1977). These
organizational forms were primarily created because of the
failure of traditional hierarchical organizations to respond
quickly, to deal with rapidly changing technologies, markets, and
environmental demands, and to efficiently involve relevant people
across the hierarchy in decisions. These organizational forms
delivered speed and flexibility of responsiveness at the expense
of clear lines of authority and responsibility. However, the
mechanisms for reac(hing decisions among organizational units, as
opposed to up and down the organization, ad to be negotiated
(Irett .and Rognes, 186). The designers of these new
organizational forms thought in terms of the organization's
structure, ignoring how these structures would affect the
politics of hw decisions are made in organizations. Thus, thtese
structur-al changes implicitly assumed that the creation of
.ommunication. channels would lead to rational, apolitical
decision making. 'This has not been the case. In reality, the
creation of new inter-dependent organizational units also created
new interest group confiurrations and increased the potential for
confi.ict and the need for effective intraorganizational
negotiations (Shull, Delbecq and Cummings, 19C69). Managers felt
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a need to negotiate that they had not perceived in hierarchical
organizations. Thus, the expanded use of matrix organizations,
task forces and other organizational designs which attempt to
increase horizontal coordination has increased the need and
desire of managers to be equipped with skills in negotiation.
A second set of environmental forces that are driving the
increased interest in negotiations research are the
transformations in markets, technologies and industrial
organization structures. These developments produce pressures to
renegotiate a variety of contractual relationships and in many
cases blur or redefine the boundaries across organizations.
The most visible indication of this transformation is the growth
of the service sector in more highly developed Western
economies. For example, a ser-vice based economy requires buyers
and sellers to agree on more ambiguou sly defined "products" that
are characteristic of the physical outputs of the manufacturing.
mining, or agricultural sectors. 'The "goods" transacted are
often personal services (such as a consulting contract), a
commitment to put certain expertise to work on a problem or to
provide information (whose ultimate value can only be estimated
with considerable uncertainty at the time a contract or agreement
is consumated.) What is the nature and scope of the negot at e
services- Is the buyer purchasing consulting time or an agreed-
upon final product? What is the time horizon relevant to each
party? Are the parties engaged in a one-time transaction or do
the parties hope to develop a future ongoing relationship,
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and thereby bargain as if the quality of the future relationship
matters? The answers to those questions are far less defined in
a service-based economy than in a manufacturing-based economy.
Note that these service transactions can occur within
organizations, or parties can negotiate with external
organizations to perform these tasks or supply these services.
Thus, one of the most important implications of the
transformation to a service economy is the blurring of
organizational boundaries and the creation of greater choice
about whether to integrate diverse functions into an existing
organization or to go into the exter-nal market and purchase the
services as long as they are needed. The number of transactions
or negotiating interactions within and across organizations
multiply as the shift continues from a manufacturing-based to a
service-based economy.
Accompanying the declining importance of manufacturing as a
percentage of total employment, however, is the increased
pressure to restructure and reconsider basic business strategies
in those su.r-viving manufacturing organizations, in order to
compete in the more highly competitive markets of the modern
world. A great deal. of the turmoil in the U.S. industrial
relations system throughout the past decade has arisen out t
these restructuring activities and the renegotiations of the
employment contracts. The American industrial relations sstem
has been affected so severely because the institutional
mechanisms for managing labor conflict have
historically depended heavily on collective bargaining. In
contrast, the changes underway call for an expansion of the
interactions among workers and employers both above the reach of
the bargaining table (the changes in business strategy employers
must make to remain competitive) and below the bargaining table
at the level of the workplace. These changes are particularly
critical as employers struggle to overcome traditional
adversarial relations and introduce greater employee commitment
and flexibility into the organization of work. The result is
-that we are moving through a period where management and labor
are renegotiating the basic structure and scope of their
relationships. It is not surprising, therefore, that this
environment calls for renewed attention to effective
negotiations, conflict resolution, and integrative bargaining.
A closely related force supporting rnewed interest in
identifying more efficient forms of conflict resolution is the
growinng importance of individual bargaining (part of the "me"
generation), as opposed to traditional collective bargaining and
duLe pro(ess mechanisms in organizations. As organizational
boundaries are blurr-ing, traditional nion-management relations
are breaking down. The labor force includes more mobile,
professional, white collar and managerial work-ers. As a result,
we can expect an epansion of individualized negotiations between
organizational members and their employers, or with other
individuals who have -some form of (-ontractual relationship with
the organization.
A final set of environmental forces affecting the importance
of negotiation in the workplace is the increased competitiveness
of the environment. The slowdowns and fluctuations in national
and world economics have created the need for cutbacks in
organizations. Conflict is rare when resources are ample.
However, when resources are scarce, conflict intensifies and the
need for conflict management increases. Increased competition
has also resulted from the dramatic increase in foreign suppliers
and the deregulation of important sectors of the U.S. economy.
The impact of foreign competition is obvious. In addition,
legislative changes in the U.S. have created a system of
negotiated compliance rather than the dictation of compliance
(Drayton, 1981). Entire industries (e.g,. all parts of the
travel industry) have been deregulated, eliminating
government-set rates and allowing a free market with full
competitive behavior to prtvail.
In summary, we have recently witnessed a number of changes
that encourage organizations to negotiate their eistence in a
more competitive world. These chanrges are partially responsible
for the increased activity by neqot:ication scholars to the area.
More specifically, (1) technological and ocietal changes, (2)
transformation of mark:ets, technologies and industrial
structures, (3) the restructuring of manufacturing, (4) the
growing importance of the individual, and (5) increased
competition have combined to increase the importance of
negotiations in organizations. However, the impact of these
environmental influences has not been equally felt across
various subareas of the field negotiation research. The sections
that follow examine recent developments in four different
substantive areas of negotiation research identified earlier.
Models of the Negotiations Process
The body of research that has the deepest roots and has had
the greatest impact on recent empirical work and popular essays
on negotiations in organizations are the behavioral and
analytical theories of bilateral bargaining. Much modern
behavioral theory and empirical research on negotiations draws
heavily on the conceptual terms and propositions presented in
Wa'lton and McPKersie (1965) and Thibaut and K::elley (1959) while
much of the analytical research draws on the game theoretic
models of Von Neuman and Morgenstern (1948), Luce and Raiffa
(1957), and Raiffa (1982). The Walton and McKersie descriptive
model has received mcre attention from organizational behavior
researchers. The game theoretic models have become more popular
in the managerial economics area as their concepts have been and
applied to a wider variety of managerial and organizational
problems. This section selectivity eamines each with the
intention to integrate the future of the two approaches.
Behavioral Models
The two most important contributions of the Walton and
McK::ersie model that have been applied in organizational research
are (1) the mixed-motive nature of negotiating relationships
(including the multiple dimensionality of the negotiation
process) and (2) the bargaining zone concept. The mixed-motive
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concept recognizes that very few intra- or interorganizational
relationships are either totally competitive or cooperative.
Instead, latent in most relationships are both cooperative and
conflictual incentives, motives, and potential outcomes. The
mixed-motive model assumes that the essence of successful
negotiations is the effective choice of strategies to reflect
individual and joint outcomes. To further explore how parties
select these strategies, Walton and McKersie introduce four
models of the negotiations process: (1) distributive
bargaining--the processes used to accommodate conflicting goals;
(2) integrative bargaining--the processes used to pursue joint
gains given issues of common interest; (3) attitudinal
structuring--the processes by which the attitudes of the parties
or the affective aspects of their relationship are formed and
maintained, and; (4) intraorganizational bargaining--the process
of accommodating among different interests within a party to a
negotiations process.
The bargaining zone concept suggested that each negotiator
has a resistance point, be.ow which he/she would prefer to not
reach agreement rather than to settle. If a gap exists between
the two parties--that is, there are no points that both parties
find acceptable--a negative contract zone exists, and no
agreement is; the predicted outcome. When resistance points
overlap, a positive bargaining zone exists, and an agreement is
-the likely outcome.
These concepts and the propositions that Walton and IMcK::ersie
developed to link them, have been a rich source of insight for
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many behavioral researchers working on the boundary of
labor-management relations and organizational behavior over the
past twenty years (see R.ochan, 198C0; Strauss, 1979; or Brett and
Hammer, 1982 for reviews of this work). For example, the models
of multilateral collective bargaining in the public sector that
were developed in the 197)0s (Kochan, 1973; Juris and Feuille,
197.3) were based on the proposition that the differences in goals
built into the structure of management of public agencies made
intraorganizational bargaining especially complex. Goals were so
disparate that the distributive bargaining process often failed
to coalesce around two distinct bilateral sets of interests or
parties. The parties themselves (e.g. managers, city council
members, agency administrators, civil service officials, etc)
differed greatly in their perception of the substantive positions
or priorit:ies to pursue in negotiations, and over who had the
power to decide on priorities. As a result, the persistance of
intraorqanizational conflicts transformed what was epected to be
a two party or bilateral negotiations between a union and a city
gcovernment into a n-party or multilateral process as each
management group attempted to directly assert its interests.
This made finding an acceptable contract zone more complex and in
many cases prolonged and escalated the conflicts.
More recently, azerman and Neale (1983; Eazerman, 1983) have
drawn heavily on behavioral decision making research to
demonstrate the existence of systematic cognitive barriers to
achieving integrative outcomes. Their work identifies cognitive
explanations for inefficient agreements (distributive agreements
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when integrative agreements were possible) and the fact that
negotiators often fail to reach agreement despite the appearance
of a positive bargaining zone. Others have taken many of Walton
and McK.ersie's propositions into the laboratory and refined them
based on their experimental results (cf. Rbin and Brown, 975).
Still others such as Pruitt, Carnevale, and their colleagues
(e.g., Pruitt, 1983; Carnevale, Pruitt and Seilheimer, 1981) have
expanded on the theor-etical. propositions in the model to develop
testable hypotheses on how negotiators can achieve integrative
bargains.
The common element in the theoretical and empirical work that
draws on behavioral. negotiation models is that social
interactions and outcomes can be improved by increasing the
.lEkil.ls of negotiators (organizational participants). These
shoulc help the negcltiator by training him/her to view the
negoti ating problem through the conceptual lens of a mi:ed-motive
framework, and t.o adopt empirical ly-verified strategies that are
well suitedc to the speci fic C di stribu.ti ve-integrat. ive mix of
i ' s es.
Analytic or Game Theoretic Models
Until recently, the summary evaluation offfered by Young
(1975) accurately portrayed the limited irnsight that formal game
theory models of negotiations had achieved: "The game theoretic
conception of bargaining has yielded a number of elegant models
but it abstracts away al.. the dynamic aspects; of bargaining and
severely limits the applicability of the concept. . . . None of
these models produces good predictions or satisfactory
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explanations concerning bargaining in the great majority of real
world cases" (Young 1975: 304; 391). The recent worki of Raiffa
(1982) and his colleagues Lax and Sebenius (forthcoming) have
gone a long way to rendering Young's assessment obsolete.
Raiffa's career transformation from a theoretical mathematician
to a policy advisor and management educator has led him to
identify ways of improving the achievement of more efficient
negotiated outcomes by improving the analytical understanding and
skills of negotiators and third party intervenors. His most
recent example of a strategy for applying the tools of game
theory is illustrated by his proposal for experimentation with
"post settlement settlement" intervention strategies (Raiffa,
1985). Lax, and Sebenius take the game theory framework further
into the realm of practice and prescription by exploring a wide
array of tactics for- moving the otcomes of mixed motive
interactions closer to the efficiency frontier. Greenhalgh and
Ne-slin (1983) further etend these models by developing
heuristics for identifying outcomes that lie on the efficient
fr ont ier. All of this research provides encouraging signs that
the intellectual foundations of both the behavioral and the game-
theoretic models have begun to move into the mainstream of
organizational research, and are being translated into tangible
prescription for improving organizational interactions and
outcomes. Thus, this general stream of negotiations research has
made a significant theoretical, empirical, and normative impact
on the study and practice of negotiations within organizations.
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The environmental influences identified earlier in this paper
have had their greatest impact on the models of the negotiation
process identified in this section. These models are the core
models for understanding bilateral negotiations.
Much of the success in the diffusion of these models is due
to the emergence of these environmental influences. But, we also
believe that this success is due to a blurring of the distinction
between the behavior-al and analytical models. Early in its
history, the behavioral model was viewed almost exclusively as a
descriptive model. In contrast, the analytical models were
e.xclu sivel y normative, with little consideration for the actual
behavior of: negotiators. Both had cdeficiencies. The behavioral
approach was not transformed into useful recommendations. In
contrast, the analytica: models offered the best prescription,
ussming that you were describing a rational actor--an assumption
with highly questionable validity (March and Simon, 1958;
I-:ahne(nman and Tversky, 10979). Recent efforts have responded to
these deficiencies. FRai-fa's (1932) asymmetrically
pr;-esriptive/descricptive framework suggests that decision
analysis should prescribe the optimal action, given the best
available description of+ the opposing negotiator. Bazerman and
Neale attempt to describe cognitive deficiencies in negotiation
with the explicit goal of improving negotiator judgment and
moving toward a prescriptiv e course of action. In both cases,
the boundary between description and prescription has been
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spanned, reducing the limitations imposed by disciplinary
barriers in the initial process models of bilateral negotiation.
The interaction between approaches is also evident in recent
work that prescibes the tactics necessary for dealing with the
mixed-motive problem. Decision analysts Lax and Sebenius
(forthcoming) move from a approach toward a descriptive approach
by offering tactical advice consistent with Raiffa's
asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive model. Social
psychologists Pruitt and Rubin extend their descriptive framework
and also offer precriptive advice. Similarly, organization
behaviorists Lewicki and Litterer (1985) offer theoretical and
strategic prescriptions based on the empirical literature on the
determinants of effective negotiations. Thus, researchers have
arrived at a fruitful middle ground between description and
prescription that did not exist a decade earlier.
In addition to the empirical and theoretical research spawned
by the early bilateral theories, there has been a recent
outpouring of popular books that use (implicitly or explicitly,
the earlier conceptual frameworks. For example, many of the
propositions developed and diffused to a popular, practitioner
audience by Fisher and Ury (1981) and Nierenberg (1973) are
derivatives of the earlier behavioral models.
The prospects for continued progress within this research
tradition are good given the number of individuals now using
these concepts as part of their own research paradigms. In
addition, the environmental influences identified
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earlier provide the impetus for further diffusion. Finally,
funding agencies (e.g., the American Arbitration Association, the
National Institutue for Dispute IResolution, the Hewlett
Foundation) are taking an unprecedented interest in the
cross-disciplinary development of the models identified in this
section. In summary, the foundation for research on bilateral
negotiations is poised for further development and diffusion over
the next decade.
Third Parties in Organizations
One special feature of negotiations within organizations is
that the existence of a hierarchical structure (which exists in
most organizations) mak es third parties naturally available to
the parties in conflict. The third party may not know of the
conflict. The third party may not choose to get involved even -f
he/she knows that the conflict eists. Using the third party may
have adverse consequences to the parties. However, in a
traditional hi erarchy, any pair of individuals has some boss in
common, and that boss may choose to eercise the structural
mandate and decide how to deal with the conflict. This
strctural perspective., combined with the inherent eistence ot
conflict in organizations, suggests that the role of third pa-t,,
decisions and the impact of potential third parties on
negotiatiated outcomes should be a central concern of
organizational researchers.
The study of third parties is not new to organizational
research. However, much of this research has studied third
parties who are not acting in a line mangement capacity. For
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example, the organizational development area has extensively
discussed the role of a "process consultant" (Walton, 1969).
Process consultants attempt to defuse tension and improve the
communication process between the parties, without explicit
attending to their substantive differences. In the labor
relations field, extensive theoretical and empirical analysis has
been accumulated on mediation and alternative forms of
arbitration (ochan, 198SC). Other research (e.g., Farber and
Katz, 1979) has given considerable attention to the interaction
between alternative third party procedures and negotiated
outcomes. However, only recently have organizational researchers
noted that the manager with conflicting subordinates is faced
with many of the same choices as "independent" third parties.
With this realization, research has begun to identify generic
i1ssues that are centr-al to the choices of managers as third
pa r-ti es.
Two major questions have been raised for consideration.
Firt., what third party procedure shoutld be adopted? Should the
manager stay out of the conflict, mediate, arbitrate, or use some
altern ative--yet Unnamed--pr- ciced ur e' These questions are central
to the sections in -this volume on mediation and procedural
justice. The answer- may depend on the natu.re of the conflict,
individual differences in the third party, and a host of other
moderating variables that ar-e specific to the managerial domain.
Sheppard (198) has provided a taxonomy of alternative forms of
managerial intervention and suggested when they might be used,
However, the systematic examination of the third party procedures
--17-
chosen by managers and their comparative effectiveness is only
beginning (e.g., Lewicki an5 Sheppard, 1995).
Second, how do third parties in organizations make
decisions? The question of how they shout:Ld make decisions has
been the subject of debate among philosophers for centuries (cf.
Bazerman, 1985 for one review). However, descriptive examination
of these decisions has been minimal. These decisions usually
concern issues of distributive justice - i.e., who will receive
what outcomes, and by what decision rule. Bazerman (1985) found
that experienced labor management arbitrators tend to make
decisions that maintain the status quo. Tversky and K::ahneman's
(1974) anchoring heuristic can be used to predict that managers
and organizations will tend to make these decisions by examining
how similar decisions were made in the past, and make
insufficient adjustments for present circumstances. Consider the
manager's conflictual.t task of distri.buting a limited and
insufficient amount of pay to ten subordinates. One could use a
zero--based bdgeting approach and totally reconsider the value of
al:L employees each year. In contrast, most organizations make
adjustments from the employee's past salary, and typically within
a very narrow band of percentage adjustments determined by
organizational policy. This process makes last year"s anchor the
central determinant in how salaries will be distributed for the
upcoming year-. Inequities are unlikely to be remedied under
these kinds of dec:ision rules.
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These two questions outline a set of concerns that important
to all managers; yet the organization's procedures and the
manager's third party "style" are often taken for granted.
Little consideration is given to the fact that research which
suggests different procedures may lead to very different levels
of personal and organizational effectiveness. However,
environmental changes are forcing researchers and practitioners
to seriously examine these issues. Overloaded courts are now
forcing organizations to consider alternative dispute resolution
procedures. Problems which used to be resolved in court cases
are now negotiated resolutions worked out by anti-litigation
oriented attorneys, brought before a mini-trial, or handled by a
low cost, contractually agreed upon arbitration procedure. The
reduction of unioniza tion has dramatized the importance of third
party procedures for handling non-union grievances, mai.king
organizational roles such as ombudsman central to many
organizations (Rotiwe and Bak.:er, 1984). Decentralization, and the
par-al lel cal C3 for profit ma>ximization by the strategic business
unit, has created the need for corporate mechanisms for handling
interdivisional disputes.
The literature ori third party intervention has produced a
wealth of information that will be useful for the developing area
of negotiation in organizations. The issues of alternative forms
of third party intervention, procedural justice, and distributive
jutstice are all central to organizational functioning. However,
organizational researchers are only beginning to incorporate
these issues into research and teaching. This area has a bright
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future and is headed in the appropriate directions. The
challenge is to develop these models over the next five years so
that they have a significant impact on the empirical research and
the development of teachable principles about negotiation and
dispute management.
Coalitions
The argument that coalition behavior constitutes an important
set of organizational actions at the broad level of
organizational theory is well accepted and has been documented in
earlier chapters in this volume (e.g., Cobb; Pearce, Stevenson,
and Porter). In contrast, the incorporation of this topic into
micro organizational behavior, theory, research, and application
has been minimal. The seeds of the study of coalition behavior
as a topic of organizational scholars can be found in the work of
Cyert and March (1963). The author suggested that an
organization's goals can best be described by the goals of the
organization's dominant coalition. Pennings and Goodman (1977)
used this framework to define organizational effectiveness as the
fulfillment of the goals of the organization's dominant
coalition. Other uses of the coalition concept are evident in
the theoretical work of Thompson (1967), Ffeffer and Salancik
(1978), and Mintzberg (198:5).
While organizational researchers have discussed the
importance of coalitions in organizations, empirical work has
been limited to three disciplines: game theory, social
psychology, and political science (Murnighan, 1978). Each area
has adopted a different philosophical. approach, used a
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different methodology, and most importantly, asked a different
set of questions. Game theoretic approaches have focused on the
development of sophisticated mathematical representations of the
coalition-oriented behavior of maximally rational actors (cf.
Rapoport, 1960). Social psychological models have focused on the
impact of the amount and kind of resources that each actor brings
to a potential coalition task (Komorita, 1974). Finally,
political models focus on the ability of a coalition to its
implement the goals following its formation (e.g., DeSwann, 1977;
River, 1962).
Each of these three disciplines has generated very high
quality work. A thorough review of the literature, however,
suggests that little overlap or infiltration has occurred among
disciplines (Murnighan, 1978), and that this research has had
virtually no impact on the study of coalitions in organizational
behavior. Given the lack of infiltration, it is appropriate to
aski:: whether the study of coalitions is useful for understanding
decision-making entities in organizations. While the lac of
research suggests that the answer is "no", the intuitive answer
appears to be-"yes". Both theorists and practitioners can
identify the relevance of coalition behavior for understanding
various organizational issues: how power is derived in
organizations, how key decision making groups such as an
executive committee or a task force will act, or understanding
how corporate networks form and operate. Given this anecdotal
evidence, and the rich disciplinary research, why has so little
infiltration occurred and what changes are necessary to advance
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coalition behavior as an organization topic?
To begin to answer this question, we return to examining the
impact of the environment. Consider the following paragraph from
a recent Boston Globe article (3/4/85, pg. 14):
With its only convention center de to close for three
years and 1500 new rooms opening at the same time, Boston has
been facing the financial. nightmare every tourism official
dreads.
But in a unique, hard-won agreement, three hotels
(within a half mile radius of the center) that were once
fiercely competitive have joined forces to keep
conventioneers coming to Boston by marketing their space as a
package:: a
These short paragraphs illustrate the importance of environmental
changes on the cr-eation of new coalitions, and new agreements
within defined coalitions. This same theme is replayed in a
statement often made by the President of the malgamated Cl.othing
and Tetile Workers Union (ACTWU), the national union that fouqht
over a decade against the J.P. Steve.,ns company fo- the right to
represent Stevens' employees. The President of ACTWU has noted
at least twice in the past year that while his union f:ights with
Stevens over union representation issues, it works cooperatively
with this company and others in the te::tile industry in lobbying
Congress for favorable trade policies. The union also work:s
jointly with the I.S. tetil.e indtustry on new technologies
designed to keep the industry compet itive in world markets.
Thus, fierce competitors (different U.S. textile firms) and
protagonists (the union and the employers) formed coalitions when
environmental changes made their interests compatible and joint
gains possible. However, note that these are temporary or
partial coalitions, limited to specific issues within the wider
scope f the parties' interactions, and hence likely to be
unst ab 1 e.
Social psychologists have long recognized the importance of
a common enemy for creating bonds. The threats posed to many
firms by increased international and domestic competition provide
the incentives for new partnerships. Two examples are (1) the
recent increase in cooperation between unions and some employers
(<::ochan, Mc::ersie, and atz, 19e5; K:atz, 1985) and (2) the number
of cooperative mer-gers that we witness today. Both call for the
coalition of forces that previously viewed their coalition
partner as an opposing force.
Fundamental internal change in the definition of the business
unit also creates the need for new coalitions. With the economy
shifting fr-om a manufacturing--based economy to a service-based
economy, the creation of new partnerships is apparent. We now
have "full service financial planning centers," composed of
services that were represented in a half a dozen different
organizations just five years ago. The internal workings of many
service organizations also create the need for new coalitions
within the firm. i-or eample, consulting organizations often
revolve around project teams that f orm as a new project is
defined. This form of organization suggests that the continual
formation and reformation of operating coalitions may partially
replace the hierarchy as the dominant organization structure of
many companies.
These examples attempt to illustrate that there are
fundamental social changes occurring, and that a byproduct of
these changes is an increase in the importance of coalition
formation and action. Coalitions are of growing importance and
the organizational environment can be epected to be amenable to
research that focuses on coalition behavior. However, this
·favorable environment does not guarantee the diffusion of
coalition work. Coalition research must offer something useful
to the organizational behavior audience. It is not unfair to
conclude that the field of organizational behavior has not viewed
p ast coalition resear-ch as directly usefull. However, a number of
barriers exist that have inhibited the diffusion process.
Identification of these barriers the first step toward improving
the influence of c-oalition research in the organizational arena.
MuLArnighan (this-, volume) attributes this lack of
cross-fertilization of coalition research to two causes. First,
the language of coalition theory and its highly formalized models
(particularly those with a game theory base) may be less
tractable than most imported research in organizational behavior.
Second, previous empirical research has been done almost
e>xclusively in the laboratory. In addition, we argue
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that the literature's assumptions of the rational decision maker
inhibits the usefulness of its advice, since one's coalition
partners may not exhibit this presumed rationality. We also
argue that coalition research has not infiltrated the
organizational arena because the specific areas of coalition that
have received attention have not been optimally targeted from an
organizational behavior standpoint, the range has been narrow,
and important issues have been unaddressed. Many of these
unaddressed issues need attention for coalition concepts to be
useful to the organizational behavior audience. For example.
there has been virtually no discussion of norm formation of
coalitions (with the exception of Bettenhausen and Murnighan, in
press), tactics for coalition formation, the decision processes
of coalition actors, and environmental influences on shifting
coalitions. Each of these domains would be of interest to
organizational behavior. In addition, the bilateral negotiation
that occurs between pairs of members in an emerging coalition
have not studied. This limits the connection between coalition
research and models of negotiation. In this regard, Murnighan's
dyadic perspective (this volume) moves in the right directlcn.
Finally, in order to move coalition research under the rubric co
negotiation research, we conceptualize coalition settings s
individuals/organizations facing a mixed-motive task in which
they must reserve sufficient independence of action to assert
their distributive interests, while simultaneously trying to
achieve the integrative opportunities of a viable coalition.
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In conclusion, we have asserted that (1) coalitions are
important to the study of organizational behavior, (2) the
infiltration of disciplinary ideas has been minimal, and (.)
observable barriers must be overcome and important topics must be
investigated for more effective dissemination to take place in
the fture. We think that these barriers are manageable and hope
to see future work in this area.
Macro Conflict Models
The study of conflict and its resolution has a long and rich
tradition within several branches of economics and political
science, yet relatively few of the concepts or- their applications
have been integrated into the study of negotiations within
organizations. Within economics, the role of conflicting
economic interests, transactions among collective units or
economic agents, and competitive behavior are deeply embedded in
the models of institutional economics (Commons, 1928; Coase,
i937) and theories of imperfect competition and oligopoly
(Edgeworth, 1881; Roulding, 1962). Interactions among parties
with separate and o:ten conflicting interests who share power is
also the essence of political science. Indeed, the major debates
among political theories revolve not around the question of 'des
conflict exist?", but, "why does it exist?" "and how should
society's institutions (the state, capital, labor, other nterest
groups, etc.) be structured to manage these different interests '
Given the complementary nature of these theories of econorit:
and institutional relationships, researchers or organizationai
negotiation might benefit from further examination of the
- 2. 6-
insights to be found in this broad intellectual domain. While
these themes have surrounded research questions addressed in
this volume and its predecessor (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983),
little of this information has infiltrated directly the
organizational arena. We will highlight a few interesting, but
highly controversial, propositions of direct applicability that
illustrate the potential benefits of deeper utilization and
empirical testing of this work.
Institutional economists and liberal pluralist political
theorists start from the proposition that society is composed of
multiple interest groups and that an effective society is one
that is able to negotiate acceptable and efficient accommodations
or transactions between or among these groups. ut an equally
important proposition is that these transactions are not
costless, nor- are all. outcomes necessaril.y efficient. Instead,
the costs of transactions, as measured by the cost of time,
resources, or- lost opportunities, can be large enough to offset
any democratic or political value gained from the relationship.
Thus, collective or organizational interactions and transactions
are often judged against the outcome that would be produced by
the free market (Williamson, 1975; Olson, 1982). If market
outcomes are equally "efficient" (i.e., the outcomes leave the
parties as well or better off than a negotiated or collective
transaction) and if the market produces these outcomes more
efficiently than negotiations (i.e., with fewer transactions
costs) then markets will prevail. The formal organization of
interest groups into interacting parties will not occur or occur.
- 2 7 -
While these general propositions have dominated the economics
and political science literatures for decades, they have also
been translated into more specific models of conflict and
negotiations through the work: of Boulding (1962), Olson (1962
1982), Williamson (1975), and Schelling (1960, 1978, 1984). What
follows is not presented as a comprehensive summary of the
implications of these models for organizational negotiations.
However, an overview of needed areas of organizational research
may illustrate how central many of these ideas are to
organizational settings.
A central proposition in the transaction cost models is that
markets serve as the alternative to organizational interactions
and that organizations ("hier-archies" in Williamsons
terminology) emerge and survive only when they are more
efficient and effective than the market in producing valued
outcomes. Institutional economists tend to state the problem in
more democrat;.c or pl.uralistic terms--institutions will arise
when groups with conflicting interests interact in settings where
neither has the power to uni. ]. aterally. determine the outcome
(Commons, 1928). Yet even when these negotiations occur, they
occur in the context of markets which constrain the parties'
discretion. The more competitive the market, the narrower the
discretion and the less slack available for transaction costs.
For example, in the context of labor management negotiations,
these propositions imply that the greater the product market
competition a firm and its employees face, the less discretion
they have in setting wages and other contract terms and the
-28-
greater the loss in market share and employment that can be
expected from a strike.
A key implication for organizational negotiations is that the
negotiating processes and outcomes are implicitly or explicitly
subject to an "efficiency" test. Stated more precisely,
negotiations processes will only survive within or among
organizations to the extent that they enhance the effectivness of
the organization(s) and the key interests within them. Just as
Fisher and Ury (1981) argue that negotiators should constantly
consider their next best alternative to a negotiated settlement,
market forces exert pressures on organizational participants to
consider their best alternative to the negotiation process
itself. Thus, researchers and practitioners need to evaluate the
results of organizational negotiations against their next best
alternative organizational or market process and outcome. Thus,
organiizational research should focus not only on the prediction
of_neqotiated outcomes _but also on the conditions under which
organizational actors will choose to negotiate.
Again an example from labor management relations may help
illustrate the importance of this point. recent study showed
that a significant proportion of the decline in unionization in
the private sector of the U.S. economy since 1960 occurred
because previously unionized employers experienced increasing
incentives and opportunities to open, maintain, and expand new
plants on a nonunion basis. Rather than intensifying their
efforts to negotiate hard with unions to bing about changes
needed to remain competitive in a changing economy, many of these
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firms chose to escape from the bargaining relationship whenever
it was feasible to do so (Kochan, McKPersie and Chalykoff, 1985).
Olson's (1962, 1982) theories of collective behavior take the
above argument one step further by emphasizing that the structure
of interest group configuration, coalition formation, and
collective representation is critical to producing efficient
societal, and by implication, organizational, outcomes. A
similar argument has been made recently in analyzing the
strategic choices made by management and labor in response to
changing markets, technologies, and labor-management relations
(Piore and Sabel, 1984; IKochan, McKersie, and PKatz, forthcoming).
Piore and Sabel argue that the growing specialization of markets
and the flexibility of production required by new technology will
demand increased organizational interdependence. As firms seek
out more specialized market niches, and attempt quicker
adaptation of products, production methods, and work
relationships to meet more specialized and varied market demands,
organizations will be more constantly renegotiating their
relationships with suppliers, customers, co-producers and
employees. Negotiations within and among organizations will
therefore increase, and the demand for integrative (cooperative
or joint gain) outcomes will intensify. Economies (or those
organizations within a given economy) will prosper if they
perform these negotiations and cooperative tasks efficiently and
effectively; however-, if they remain fix:ed in a world view of the
mass production marketplace of the past, or if they fail to
transform what have traditionally been adversarial into
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cooperative relationships, they will decline.
Recent industrial relations theory and institutional practice
complements Piore and Sabel's thinking. This research argues
that by responding to increasing competitive markets and changing
technologies, as well as the values and strategies of key
managerial decision-makers, corporate managers are forcing
-fundamental renegotiations of the structure of industrial
relations in at the workplace, in collective bargaining, and at
the strategic decision making level within corporations, labor
organizations and governments (Kochan, Mcr::ersie, and K::atz,
forthcoming). The ability of these groups to coherently
restructure their industrial relations systems in relationship to
these three levels of activity will determine the extent to which
industrial relations contributes to or constrains organizational
effectiveness, the welfare of workers, and the achievement of
society's economic and democratic goals.
Thus, the crrent period is one of searching for more
efficient and effective structures for responding to important
changes in eternal mark:ets and technologies, and ways to
accommodate individual needs and interests. In analyzing these
negotiations, organizational theorists need to consider the
market, technological and business strategy forces that drive the
restructuri'ng effort, and influence the negotiated relationships
that emerge. In summary, the theoryand iractice of neqotiat ons
lwithin organizations need to more seriously consider the external_
and internal organizational contexts in which they occur.
Olson's work on collective interactions is more pessimistic.
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In his early (1962) work, he used the concepts of "public goods"
and "free riders" to identify an important paradox that applies
to all negotiations involving collectivities (coalitions of
individuals into groups or representative organizations). The
parado.: is that while the primary contribution of collective
representation in society is to further democracy by
enfranchising otherwise powerless individuals, to do so requires
a degree of coercion by the collective to get individuals to join
and maintain membership. That is, a free rider problem exists
when a set of individuals share a common interest in organizing
but each has the incentive to not participate actively (by
contributing dues or personal resources) as long as enough of the
others in the group do so. The free rider problem has been
identified by a number of scholars from various disciplines and
is conceptuall y similar to the "social problem" (Dawes, 1980) and
the "problem of the cornmons" (Hardin, 19-s). The seriousness of
the problem is expected to increase as group size increases,
therefore, large collective groups (unions or cartels) tend to
impose san(tions or require group membership f or all those
benefiting from t.he r-esults of4 the negotiations. Thus, achieving
effective negotiations that further democracy requires coercion
of individuals.
In his more recent work., Olson (19S82) takes an even more
pessimistic tone. He argues; that it is very difficult to
structure and maintain efficient interest groups. Interest
groups tend to proliferate over time and produce even more narrow
interests groups that seel:: to perpetuate themselves rather than
-_-
broad societal objectives. Thus, that societies that allow the
growth of more special interest group structures, who exercise
power through negotiation rather than allowing market forces to
play freely, are doomed to economic decline. Translated to the
organizational level, Olson's argument poses the ultimate
challenge to negotiation theorists and practitioners. The more a
structure encourages negotiation processes to proliferate within
or between organizations_ the more difficult it will be to
structure andmanage the ngotiationsin_ways that achieve
efficient and effective outcomes. In addition, the more
participation is encouraged within organizations composed of
individuals or groups with diverse interests, the more difficult
the management task will be. While one need not (indeed we do
not) accept all of Olsons arguments, he has thrown theoretical
and practical down to those who see negotiations as becoming an
increasingly vital part of organizational life.
An rganizational level eample might help illustrate the
central theoretical and practical relevance of these ideas for
research on organizatinal negotiations and conflict resolution.
Two recent studies documented the negative effects that poor
management of workplace industrial relations conflicts can have
on organizational performance. Specifically both studies found
that the higher the number of unresolved grievances, the larger
the numbers of demands introduced in plant level contract
negotiations, the longer it took to reach an agreement in
negotiations, and the more hostile the attitudes in the plant
between management and labor, the lower the labor efficiency and
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the lower the product quality of the plant (atz, ::ochan and
Gobeille, 1984; Katz, ::ochan and Weber, 1985). Yet among the
fifty plants studied in this research, some had developed
effective means of resolving their differences and thereby
enhanced organizational performance while others fell into a high
conflict/low trust pattern that produced negative performance
effects. Thus, it is not the existence of conflict or the need
for negotiations per se that we see potentially leading to
negative organizational or societal performance, but the failure
to identify and achieve effective negotiations and conflict
resolution or management. The challenge for negotiations
researchers, therefore, is not to encourage the suppression of
conflict and negotiations in settings where they are essential
for- the mangement of diverse interests but to provide the
theoretical ideas and practical skills needed to improve the
effectiveness of conflict resolution.
The point of reviewing models of conflict with an economics,
political science or- industrial relations base is to draw
attention to an important set of macro theoretical arguments that
organizational negotiations theorists and researchers need to
address. Because these theoretical arguments have largely been
couched in the language of economic or political theory, been
applied in the contex<t of industrial organization or labor
management relations, and foc:used on formal institutional
structures and relationships (union-management relations), they
have been largely inaccessable to the work of organizational
behavior researchers. Given the environmental conditions
-. 4-
discussed at the outset of this paper, the issues addressed in
these macro models are becoming increasingly important to
micro-level negotiations within organizations. This trend
presents a challenging opportunity for progress in the theory and
practice of negotiations.
In summary, we see the issues raised by these macro level
frameworks as offering new challenges to the development of a
negotiations literature in organizations. However, this domain
of negotiation is far less developed than others we have
reviewed. While the models of the negotiation process are well
developed, and the third parties and coalitions literatures are
just being integrated into the organizational arena, macro models
of conflict are often not identified as part of the negotiation
turf. This section is meant to focus on the challenges offered
by this area to the negotiation research ommunity.
Conclusions and_Implications
We started this analysis by noting that the contemporary
environment is challenging researchers to produce new insights
into effective negotiations within organizations. In addition,
there are a number of encouraging signs that the research
profession has been making considerable progress in recent
years. All indications are that the environment and a community
of scholars interested in negotiations in organizations will
continue to make theoretical and empirical research advances in
the coming years.
To effectively translate this research into organizational
practices, researchers will need to continue to test the
-35.-
implications of their- models and to integrate more fully the
micro and macro perspective on models of coalitions and conflict
management.
The macro models of conflict appear to be the least well
integrated and utilized in organizational negotiations research,
and yet we believe that they pose the deepest intellectual and
practical challenges to the field. The intellectuial challenqe
arises from our belief that while future organizational relations
wi.l increase in the number and comple>ity of negotiations
processes, some macro theorists propose that societies are not
good at designing effective structures and conflict resolution
processes for managing complex interest groups. For the current
optimism about the future of research and practice of negotiation
in organizations to endure, we believe that this proposition will
have to be shown to be incorrect.
The third party dispute resolution literature may offer part
of the answer to this challenge, since its central role is to
bu:ild on theories of conflict and negotiation to design effectt. e
conflict resolution processes. Given increased eperimentaticn
with third party procedures both within and outside of the
original labor-management and legal arenas, organizational
researchers have fertile empirical laboratories from which tn
draw. We are further encouraged by the growing interest of
important client and funding organizations such as the American
Arbitration Association, the Society for Frofessionals in lp-,. te
Resolution, the Nationa]. Institute for Dispute Resolution, etc.
in supporting and providing access; to ongoing dispute resolution
processes and professionals. Thus, we have reason to epect
significant activity and progress in the near future from
researchers and practioners in this area. The key to meeting
this expectation lies in demonstrating the contextual relevance
of eisting models to different organizational settings. In
turn, this requires organizational researchers to deepen their
own understanding of the multiple contexts in which
organizational negotiations occur. This was one of the keys to
the successful diffusion and institutionalization of third party
mediation, arbitration, and related conflict resolution
procedures in the practice of labor-management relations. The
same level of understanding will be needed to have an equally
strong impact on organizational negotiations and conflict
resolution systems.
The coalition literature faces the challenge of translating
the empirical insights from laboratory experiments and micro
models of coalition behavior into the more macro models of
coalitions found in actual organizations. This area of research
may be a position similar to that held by formal models of
negotiations prior to their conversion into practical management
tools. Work that demonstrates the relevance of formal models to
the real world of organizational coalitions would be received
with equal enthusiasm.
-37-
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In summary, we have reason to be considerably more positive
about the state of negotiations in organizations research and its
applicability than the assessment made three years ago by K::ochan
and Verma (1983). Whether another positive assessment is
warranted three or four years hence will depend on the ability of
of researchers working in this area to address the challenges
posed by the papers in this volume.
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